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**Weniger Souveränität – Mehr Sicherheit**  
**Schutz der Heimat im Informationszeitalter**  
**und die Rolle der Streitkräfte**

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Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen

## **Homeland Security and the Role of the Armed Forces: A Scandinavian Perspective**

### **Homeland Security and Scandinavia: Why Care?**

The Scandinavian countries occupy a quiet corner of the world and take up very little space on the map. With a pragmatist and consensus oriented political culture and almost perfect overlap between state and nation the citizens of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have been spared the experience of leftist terrorism that plagued countries like Italy and Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the separatist violence that has beset for example the United Kingdom and Spain for decades.

To date Scandinavia has neither produced terrorist groups, nor been their target. On the face of things, the region should take a limited interest in counter-terrorism and homeland security and, in turn, be of limited interest to students of these fields. Yet, the plot of September 11th illustrated the transborder nature of the threat from large-scale terrorism. If some countries do a bad job on counter-terrorism, others will suffer the consequences as well. When it comes to protecting against attacks with contagious diseases or attacks on international critical infrastructure or transportation networks, the chain is no stronger than the weakest link. Despite their smallness, the actions and omissions of Scandinavian countries might have real consequences for other countries.

Moreover, arguably the Scandinavian experience, exactly because of the political culture and smallness of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, offers lessons of broader relevance. Most likely it should be easier to establish an overview of critical infrastructure and its interdependencies, standardize procedures and equipment, apply systematic and uniform risk assessment tools, and achieve effective cross-governmental coordination in a geographically limited area, populated by relatively homogenous populations – populations characterized by a high level of trust in the authorities. All in all, Scandinavia ought to represent a benign environment for enhancing homeland security and thus the Scandinavian experience should illustrate the possibilities, but also the sticky points when it comes to forging homeland security policies for a larger area.

This article explains the Scandinavian approach to homeland security. With special emphasis on Denmark, it provides an overview of threat perception and reaction to September 11th and discusses the challenges and opportunities entailed in the recent merger of the Danish Civil Emergency Management Agency and the Ministry of Defense. Finally, it highlights concepts and lessons from Scandinavia that should be of broader interests in the search for a European homeland security strategy.

### **From the Soviet Collapse to September 11th, 2001**

In security matters, the 1990s were a relatively carefree decade for the Scandinavians. The Soviet collapse left them in a benign geostrategic environment, surrounded by friends and with no traditional territorial threat to their homelands. However, it was also a decade in which global mobility, communication, and asymmetric threats gradually took centerstage, making the influence of geography and size on security less clear cut. Cyber security, environmental security, vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, organized crime, migration, and terrorism were among the new topics.<sup>67</sup>

In this environment a transformation of both civilian crisis management systems and defense concepts slowly got under way in all three countries. During the Cold War both Denmark, Norway, and Sweden operated with the concept of “total defense,” entailing the mobilization of all available resources – public and private, civil and military – for a coordinated defense effort in case of a Soviet attack. As territorial defense became less pre-imminent, “total defense” instead became a question of coordinating a number of different actors, including the military, in support of civilian authorities to harden and defend the homeland against the variety of new risks and threats that came to the fore.

Scandinavian interest in the area covered by the “soft” side of homeland security – vulnerability reduction and civil protection – grew gradually over the 1990s. Within the Scandinavian welfare state tradition – a tradition giving the state a wide range of responsibilities for the security and welfare of the citizens – it was natural that the state should take the lead in protecting citizens and critical societal functions against a broad range of natural and man-made risks.

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<sup>67</sup> Jonas Holmgren and Jan Softa, *Functional Security. Comparative Analysis of the Nordic States' Agenda in the Fields of Critical Infrastructure, IT Security, NBC Issues and Terrorism* (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), pp. 140-175.

Norway and Sweden had already during the late 1990s initiated or carried out comprehensive vulnerability analysis and organizational restructuring to better deal with the risks and security threats of the post-Cold War environment. Whereas U.S. policymakers in the wake of September 11th opted for an organizational consolidation of homeland security tasks within a new Department of Homeland Security, the Scandinavians maintained the principle of sectoral responsibility: The agency, which has day-to-day responsibility for a certain public service, maintains responsibility for that service in case of a crisis or catastrophe. Each public agency thus, assisted by the national emergency management agency, has the responsibility to develop emergency plans. Still, all countries eventually concluded that there was a need to strengthen the central coordinating capability to handle major crises and emergencies.<sup>68</sup>

The Norwegian vulnerability commission reported in the year 2000, emphasizing among others the importance of cross-governmental cooperation to prevent and respond to major crises. A new directorate for societal security and preparedness was established under the Ministry of Justice. The directorate monitors development of risks and vulnerabilities in all sectors of the Norwegian society and promotes research.<sup>69</sup>

The Swedish Commission on Vulnerability and Security reported in May 2001. It called for a more comprehensive view on the vulnerabilities of Swedish society and for taking the interdependence between different functional sectors more into account. It also pointed to deficiencies in the ability to manage a major crisis spilling over administrative and functional borders. A new directorate for civil security – Krisberedskapsmyndigheten – under the Ministry of Defense was established to remedy the identified deficiencies. The directorate is responsible for analysis and evaluation of the development of vulnerabilities in all sectors of Swedish society and for advising the government on how to prioritize between different tasks and distribute resources between the different functional sectors and ministries in order to enhance the security of the homeland.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Typically the national emergency management agency also had responsibility to issue standards and guidelines for the local and regional emergency response systems.

<sup>69</sup> Statens forvaltningstjeneste, *Et sårbart samfunn*, NOU 2000:24 (Oslo: Statens forvaltningstjeneste, 2000), pp. 1-7. Efforts to enhance civil-military cooperation have also taken place. A joint civil-military exercise to train procedures for military support for the police in a crisis situation took place in September 2004. For information on the exercise, see <<http://www.mil.no/ovelser/kristiania04/start/>> (accessed: 15 September 2004)

<sup>70</sup> The Swedish Commission on Vulnerability and Security, *Vulnerability and Security in a New Era – A Summary*, SOU 2001:41 (Stockholm: Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 2001).

September 11th elevated the threat of terrorism and added impetus to the process in which Scandinavian defense concepts and civilian crisis management systems were being recast. Particularly Danish authorities were, as discussed below, set scrambling to catch up with the Scandinavian neighbours in the area of civil protection.

Though it remains the dominant perception that the direct terrorist threat to Scandinavia is limited, it is also understood that Al-Qaida-inspired terrorism operates across borders, and that, in increasingly interdependent societies, consequences of attacks will be felt far from the immediate impact zone. Thus, Scandinavians might suffer the consequences of attacks elsewhere, and their own homelands can no longer be considered immune due to privileged historical and geographical circumstances.

Moreover, military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively have brought Norway and Denmark to the attention of elements of the al-Qaidaist movement. In May 2003, Norwegian interests abroad were identified by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's second in command, as legitimate terrorist targets, presumably due to Norway's presence in Afghanistan. In August and September 2004, Denmark was threatened with attacks by two different obscure extremists groups, demanding a withdrawal of Danish troops from Iraq. Home grown problems of alienation and discrimination might provide extremist organizations with potential recruits among the Muslim communities in Scandinavia itself, as is the case in other European countries. Though the Scandinavians have been spared trouble at home, young Danish citizens are for example known to have trained in terrorist camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bosnia, and to have engaged in violent Jihad in Chechnya and Afghanistan.<sup>71</sup>

In sum, the Scandinavians clearly have a stake in homeland security. Today, interdependence with the rest of the world, international military engagements, and home grown problems partly offset the benefits of smallness, traditional inconspicuousness, and a fortunate geostrategic position. However, the Scandinavians have maintained the all-hazard approach to homeland security forged over the course of the 1990s, framing policies to deal with a broad range of risks, not primarily terrorism. Though the American term "homeland security" is in common use, Scandinavians also use other expressions such as "societal security" or "comprehensive security" to explain the objective of the transformation.

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<sup>71</sup> Danish Security Intelligence Service, *Annual Report 2002* (Copenhagen: Danish Security Intelligence Services, 2002), pp. 39-40.

### **Reacting to September 11th – the Danish Experience**

Denmark had been slower to reform its domestic security system than its Scandinavian neighbours. When the hijacked aircraft hit their targets in New York and Washington D.C., Denmark had not completed a comprehensive national vulnerability analysis. There had not been a joint national crisis management exercise for more than a decade and the definition of total defense had not been revised since 1986. Finally, the national emergency plan – the game plan for how different parts of the government, local authorities, the private sector, and the public were to react and interact in case of different crisis scenarios – had not been updated over the 1990s to reflect the new security threats.<sup>72</sup>

With the terrorist attacks on the U.S., however, Danish authorities swung into action. With new anti-terrorism legislation the police and security services were given broader powers to monitor, search, and detain suspects in terror related cases.<sup>73</sup> The budget of the Danish Security Intelligence Service – the Danish MI5 – received a significant boost. Counterterrorism was elevated to the top of the agenda and a number of new outreach activities were initiated to increase the ability of employees of universities, certain private sector companies, the Danish Rail etc. to spot and react to suspicious activities.<sup>74</sup>

The national emergency plan was updated and more resources were allocated to the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). New DEMA equipment such as protective gear against chemical weapons and equipment to prevent the collapse of tall buildings was procured. Moreover, it was decided to reactivate the practice of national tabletop crises management exercises. The

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<sup>72</sup> Peter Wehler, *Terrorberedskabet i Danmark* (Copenhagen: Danish Emergency Management Agency, 2003), <[http://www.brs.dk/diverse/terrorberedskaber\\_i\\_danmark.htm](http://www.brs.dk/diverse/terrorberedskaber_i_danmark.htm)> (accessed: 10 January 2004).

<sup>73</sup> „Lov om ændring af straffeloven, retsplejeloven, lov om konkurrence- og forbrugerforhold på telemarkedet, våbenloven, udleveringsloven samt lov om udlevering af lovovertrædere til Finland, Island, Norge og Sverige, Lov nr. 378 af 06/06/2002 (gældende)“; Jørn Vestergaard, „Anti-Terrorpakken – den strafferetlige del,“ *Lov & Ret*, 1/2002, pp. 1-5.

<sup>74</sup> Arguably the targeted outreach activities of the Danish Security Intelligence Service works better than general alerts of the US Homeland Security Advisory System. It avoids fanning a general feeling of anxiety. It provides information about what possible tell-tale signs of potential terrorist activity a specific audience should be aware of within their specific sector. The targeted outreach activities are also less easily politicized as they cannot be used as bureaucratic tail covering, as the general alerts of U.S. authorities occasionally appear to do. The question remains, however, if the general public should not be further involved. Since civilians are on the front lines it is only logical that they should participate actively in prevention and response activities. It is worth considering making first aid education part of the school curriculum and make occasional evacuation and emergency drills obligatory within both the public and private sector.

first took place in the fall of 2003 and henceforth there will be a national table-top exercise every second year.<sup>75</sup>

September 11th and the anthrax letters that terrorized the U.S. East Coast in the months that followed also led to a re-evaluation of the CBRN threat against the Danish homeland. A new National Centre for Biological Defence was established. The responsibility for preventing and responding to various potential CBRN threats remains divided between the new Center, DEMA, and “Statens Institut for Strålehygiene” under the Ministry of the Interior. Yet, the area has clearly obtained greater priority after a decade in which the danger of a CBRN attack on Danish soil was regarded as almost nil, and practitioners claim that co-operation between the various agencies responsible for protecting the Danes against CBRN attacks works well.<sup>76</sup>

The Danish vulnerability commission reported in January 2004, delivering conclusions and recommendations resembling those of its Norwegian and Swedish counterparts.<sup>77</sup> The commission called for more emphasis on vulnerability reduction in all sectors of society, and the development of a capacity to monitor and study the development of societal vulnerabilities in a comprehensive way. It also called for the development of risk-assessment tools to be applied across the different functional sectors of society to guide the distribution of resources. Finally, it emphasized, the need for improved cross-governmental coordination and communication to respond to major incidents in an effective manner.<sup>78</sup>

Today, the vast majority of DEMA’s resources are consumed by issues and activities related to crisis response rather than research and vulnerability reduction. The ability to monitor the development of vulnerabilities and create a cross-governmental overview is lacking. In these respects, Denmark still needs to catch up with its Scandinavian neighbours.

In other areas, however, Denmark aimed for a leadership position. With military participation in both Afghanistan and Iraq and a government with a

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<sup>75</sup> Michael Queck, „Forsvarets Beredskabsplan,“ *Forsvaret 2* (May/June 2004), p. 8.

<sup>76</sup> Author’s interviews, Copenhagen, 27. and 28. September, 2004. Claus Arboe-Rasmussen, „Vi afprøvede samarbejdsformen under Danmarks EU-formandskab sidste år,“ *Folk og Forsvar 1* (February 2003), p. 3.

<sup>77</sup> Udvalget for National Sårbarhedsudredning, *National Sårbarhedsudredning* (Birkerød: Danish Emergency Management Agency, 2004).

<sup>78</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Some Danish Initiatives in the Aftermath of 11 September* (Copenhagen, Ministry of Defence, 2003), <<http://www.fimn.dk/NR/rdonlyres/AACFA6D0-B2BA-402F-9771-93F087B28AD6/0/11sep.pdf>> (accessed: 17. September 2004); Udvalget for National Sårbarhedsudredning, *National Sårbarhedsudredning* (Birkerød: Danish Emergency Management Agency, 2004), pp. 53-54.

strong disposition for Transatlantic cooperation, the Danish defense transformation received a boost. The four-year Danish defense agreement of 2004 identified two primary tasks for the armed forces: To participate in international crisis management efforts and to support civilian authorities in the provision of homeland security in case of a terrorist attack or a major disaster. Specifically, the military would assist in guarding critical infrastructure, evacuation, sanitary support, and de-contamination of CBRN polluted areas.<sup>79</sup> The new defense agreement obliges the military to develop and maintain the capabilities to lift homeland security tasks, capabilities that had been downgraded over the 1990s as the territorial threat disappeared.<sup>80</sup>

Many details of the new agreement remain to be worked out. It is not yet clear to what extent the equipment profile of the armed forces will need to change. It is also not clear whether certain military capabilities should be earmarked for homeland security. It is clear, however, that the intention is to standardize the equipment of first responders and military forces to the greatest possible extent to enhance flexibility and interoperability. It is also certain that the Defense Agreement will lead to adjustments in the education of conscripts and of volunteers in the Danish Home Guard in order to strengthen Danish homeland security.

In future Danish conscripts will serve four months. The education of these conscripts will be attuned to homeland security needs and focus on tasks such as guard duty, first aid, fire fighting, de-contamination etc. Within three years of completing their education these conscripts will remain available for call up in case of a major disaster or emergency. A total defense force consisting of 12'000 conscripts will thus be available for homeland security tasks.

The Danish Home Guard will likewise focus more on homeland security needs. The Home Guard has almost 60'000 members and a tradition for assisting DEMA or the police in connection with disasters or large public events. If requested by the police the Home Guard can assist with specific tasks in peacetime such as monitoring and guarding critical facilities providing sanitary units and assist with traffic control. Since the year 2000 a force of up to 3'000 Home Guard volunteers with enhanced education and equipment has been taking over tasks that were previously solved by the regular armed forces. With the new de-

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<sup>79</sup> „Arbejdsgruppen vedrørende en samling af det civile beredskab og forsvarets opgaver,“ Copenhagen, December 2003; Forsvarsforlig, Ministry of Defense, Copenhagen, 10 June 2004.

<sup>80</sup> N.-J. K. Kvist, „Hærens Operative Kommandos rolle i totalforsvaret,“ *Militært Tidsskrift* 5 (December 2002), p. 559.

fense agreement, this enhanced force will focus on homeland security tasks and be available to support civilian authorities in case of need. To enhance interoperability with regular forces and first responders, this Home Guard force will receive an education that corresponds to the new homeland security education of conscripts.<sup>81</sup>

Active duty personnel of the armed forces and volunteers organized in the Home Guard will be deployed first in case of a crisis that requires a quick response. Conscripts in the total defense force will be called up if the scale or duration of a crisis demands it. The control arrangements are unaltered. The government decides when an emergency is so grave, that military forces should step in to support civilian authorities. The local chief of police is in command of the joint military-civil operation.

The redefinition of the domestic role of the military entails a convergence between the tasks of the armed forces and those of the national civilian emergency management system. Thus, in an attempt to promote coordination of civilian and military crisis management capabilities both at home and internationally DEMA was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defense as of January 2004.

### **Integrating Military and Civilian Capabilities: Opportunities and Challenges**

Simplify, rationalize, optimize – this was the threefold rationale put forward by the Danish government to explain its decision to transfer DEMA to the Ministry of Defense: Simplify current structures by merging two of the actors in Danish homeland security; rationalize through common use of support structures, logistics, schools, depots, and infrastructure; and optimize effectiveness by creating a common pool of resources, more common education, and common planning. However, like every institutional re-organization the merger of DEMA and the Ministry of Defense entails not only opportunities, but also challenges.

As suggested by the government, the transfer of DEMA entails opportunities for rationalization and optimization. Coordinating the planning and procurement process of the two agencies, working towards common standards, and creating a common pool of resources within one ministry should enhance interoperability, effectiveness, and efficiency.

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<sup>81</sup> Statsrevisoratet, 7/03 Beretning om hjemmeværnet, <<http://www.ft.dk/BAGGRUND/statsrev/0703.htm#V>> (accessed: 14 October 2004).

DEMA always used the military equipment standards in the CBRN area. The reason was simple. In a small country it was seen as untenable to develop different standards for the military and civilian system respectively. Clearly, however, the scenarios and doctrine for the use of this equipment have been different between the two services with DEMA focussing on civil protection and the armed forces on force protection.<sup>82</sup> With the merger it would appear logical to further expand this standardization of equipment to cover for example transportation and communication capabilities.

Moreover, conscripts and volunteers in the Home Guard will, as mentioned above, in future receive corresponding education, using the same curriculum, schools, and instructors to the greatest possible extent. The education of conscripts in DEMA remains a longer and separate education. DEMA educates 650 conscripts every year. These conscripts receive a six month education as opposed to the more basic four month total defense education of future conscripts in the armed forces. When it comes to education of officers, however, DEMA has and will continue to use the military leader education for certain parts of the education of its personnel.

All in all, the merger and planned changes in education offer the opportunity to enhance interoperability, flexibility, and efficiency in the provision of homeland security. But the greatest potential benefits are more impalpable. They would consist in a mutual exchange of knowledge and expertise within both merged services.

The expertise of DEMA could inform the efforts of the armed forces to define its role in homeland security and implement the necessary changes in training, procedures, force structures, and equipment profile. When it comes to international peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, the need for a comprehensive approach wielding military instruments, police, and civilian aid and reconstruction teams in a flexible and seamless manner is widely recognized. By incorporating DEMA even more closely in the planning and deployment of Danish peacekeepers, the effectiveness of Denmark's international engagement should be enhanced.

The expertise of the armed forces, on the other hand, could inform the adaptation of the domestic Danish crisis management system to the new threat environment, in which terrorism against the Danish homeland can no longer be excluded. On the face of things, responding to relatively small terrorist attacks like the ones characterizing the period after September 11th are similar to responding

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<sup>82</sup> Author's interview with officials, Copenhagen, 18 October 2004.

to a natural disaster or accident. However, terrorist organizations differ from storms or accidents by representing learning and malicious opponents. Al-Qaida has proved its ability to learn from past mistakes and though the organization is currently under pressure from a variety of international anti-terrorism initiatives, regional groups and local cells have shown their ability to imitate Al-Qaida's methods and modus operandi.<sup>83</sup> When planning and training the response to a major terrorist incident, the notion that the scene could become intentionally hostile for the responders through contamination or follow-on attacks should at least be considered. In this, DEMA should be able to benefit from the expertise of the armed forces.

All in all, if managed and implemented well, the merger has the potential to rationalize and optimize the provision of homeland security as well as Denmark's contribution to international crisis management. The transfer could promote a new and more comprehensive way of thinking about crisis management and security, both at home and internationally, in which military and civilian aspects are integrated more closely than today.

A number of challenges, however, remain. First, the government has emphasized organizational simplification as one of the rationales for transferring DEMA from the Ministry of Interior and Health to the Ministry of Defense.

It is true, that the transfer simplifies the structures of the Danish emergency response system by eliminating the institutional dividing line between the agencies responsible for first responders and the military personnel that might be mobilized in their support. However, as indicated in the left-hand column of Table 1, homeland security is not just about responding to a disaster once it has occurred. It is also about reducing societal vulnerabilities by considering aspects of safety and security as an integral part of the planning and activities of numerous private and public agencies and companies and make sure these activities are prioritized and coordinated by an agency or actor maintaining an overall view on the vulnerabilities of society.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Investigating the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen it was discovered that Al-Qaida had originally attempted an attack on the U.S.S. Sullivans in January 2000. This attack failed because the explosive-laden boat used as a weapon had been overloaded and sunk. *Overview of the Enemy*, Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 15. See also Ariane Eujung Cha, "From a Virtual Shadow, Messages of Terror," *Washington Post* 2. October 2004, p. A1; Gabriel Weimann, [www.terror.net](http://www.terror.net). *How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet* USIP Special Report 116 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2004).

<sup>84</sup> The left hand column in Table 1 displays the goals of homeland security as defined in the U.S. national strategy of homeland security. Danish authorities have not offered an equally succinct

This entails the need to motivate and coordinate a variety of actors listed in the right hand column of Table 1. The challenge of persuading, cajoling, or forcing these to give the necessary priority to vulnerability reduction and emergency planning within their respective area of competence remains substantial. The Danish national crisis management exercise of 2003 confirmed just how difficult it is to prompt ministries and agencies created for different purposes to take security seriously.<sup>85</sup>

Mission	Actors
Reduce societal vulnerabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• FE (Defense Intelligence Service, foreign)</li><li>• PET (Danish Security Intelligence Service, domestic)</li></ul>
Prevent terrorism	
Minimizing damage in case of an attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MoD, Armed Forces, Home Guard</li><li>• Foreign Affairs</li><li>• Interior and Health</li><li>• Justice</li><li>• Transportation</li><li>• DEMA</li><li>• Environment</li><li>• Knowledge, Technology, and Education</li><li>• Commerce</li><li>• Counties and municipalities, private sector, population</li></ul>

Table 1: Mission and actors in homeland security

Though the merger of DEMA and the Ministry of Defense has erased an institutional dividing line between two actors in the Danish emergency response system, it has simply moved a dividing line within Danish homeland security

definition of homeland security, but talk about using law enforcement tools and creating a „robust emergency management capability“ at home. The Danish Vulnerability Report in line with the Norwegian and Swedish reports emphasized the need to grant increased priority to long term preventive efforts and efforts to reduce societal vulnerabilities, including more focus on research and evaluation. *En verden i forandring – nye trusler, nye svar*. Redegørelse fra regeringen om indsatsen mod terrorisme (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), p. 12; Udvalget for National Sårbarhedsudredning, *National Sårbarhedsudredning* (Birkerød: Danish Emergency Management Agency, 2004), p. 10.

<sup>85</sup> Danish Emergency Management Agency, „Samlet evalueringsrapport. Krisestyringsøvelse 2003 (KRISØV 2003),“ (Copenhagen: DEMA, 2004), pp. 7, 12

looked at more broadly. The challenge of cross-governmental coordination has not been overcome. One of the dangers of the merger is, that politicians might fall into the trap of thinking that they have now solved the problem and turn their attention elsewhere. In this case, the merger could actually damage Denmark's homeland security.

A second and related challenge is to prioritize homeland security goals and tasks. To date, the bulk of DEMA's work has centred on emergency planning and response. However, DEMA has recently attempted to step up efforts within the field of research and evaluation with a view to establish an overview over societal vulnerabilities and chart ways of reducing them.<sup>86</sup> Yet, the natural focus of the Ministry of Defense is emergency response or prevention through enhanced patrolling and facility protection, as the role of the military in homeland security would mainly fall within this category. This raises the question, what will happen to the attempt to move emphasis from emergency response to vulnerability reduction and prevention when the relatively small DEMA is folded into the Ministry of Defense? DEMA has about 600 employees and a yearly budget of about 60,8 mio €. The armed forces, in contrast, employ almost 30,000 people and operate on a yearly budget of 2,56 bn €.<sup>87</sup>

Currently, DEMA is hardly staffed, structured, and funded to lift the task of monitoring the development of vulnerabilities in different sectors of society, develop and apply common risk-assessment tools that can be used across different societal sectors, and advice on where to invest scarce resources in order to enhance societal robustness to the greatest possible extent. DEMA has a total of about 24 persons working on analysis and evaluation in connection with major disasters and terrorism. In comparison, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency dedicates about 5,55 mio € yearly to research and the Norwegian Directorate for Societal Security and Preparedness has about twenty in-house analysts as well as a yearly budget of about 780'000 € to commission research from think tanks and research institutions.

A final challenge is to prioritize between domestic and international tasks. With the new force structures described above a total number of 15'000 trained Home Guard and total defense conscripts will be earmarked for homeland security tasks. Moreover, the Danish military has earmarked certain medical capa-

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<sup>86</sup> Videnindsamlings- og forskningsaktiviteter vedrørende store ulykker og katastrofer – herunder terrorisme. Beredskabsstyrelsen Udredning og Analyse (Copenhagen: Danish Emergency Management Agency, 2004).

<sup>87</sup> Forsvarsforlig (Copenhagen; Ministry of Defense, 2004), p. 17.

bilities to homeland security through a cooperation agreement with the National Centre for Biological Defence. However, the question remains whether the new defense agreement and the new threat environment entails that the Danish military should earmark further capabilities for homeland security – for example transportation or evacuation capabilities or CBRN de-contamination equipment. In order to determine this, the military needs to define its homeland security goals and tasks clearly and, based on historical cases or scenarios, establish what capabilities are necessary to lift these tasks.

The American experience indicates that the number of troops – National Guard or regular army forces – available for relatively simple homeland security tasks such as protecting critical infrastructure, assisting in traffic control, or providing security at special events is sufficient. However, in the areas like engineering, medical support, counter-CBRN, and command and control, skills are in short supply.<sup>88</sup>

Naturally, the planning assumptions will be different in a small northern European country. It is perfectly possible, that the planning process will result in the decision that it is unnecessary to earmark further military capabilities to lift homeland security tasks. But arguably, it does not make the planning process less necessary. Considering the level of uncertainty as to the nature of future risks and threats, and the necessity to prioritize and make hard choices a certain public and political involvement is crucial and thus, goals, scenarios, and planning assumptions must be made explicit.

### **In Search of a European Homeland Security Strategy: Three Lessons from Scandinavia**

As illustrated, the Scandinavians do not have an elegant or readymade homeland security strategy that can be exported to the rest of the world. Like in most other places homeland security is work in progress. Still, their experience provides some lessons that should have broader interests when it comes to creating an overview of societal vulnerabilities, organizing for homeland security, and cross-governmental coordination.

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<sup>88</sup> Lynn E. Davis, „Defining the Army’s Homeland Security Needs,“ in David Shapiro (ed.), *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy* (RAND, California, 2003), p. 64.

*Vulnerability Analysis*

All three Scandinavian countries have carried out comprehensive vulnerability analysis. Arguably, in light of the countless vulnerable points of modern society and the increasing interdependence between different sectors of society, a cross-sectoral overview of vulnerabilities is the indispensable starting point for any reasonable homeland security strategy. If this is true in a small country it is even more true when it comes to providing security within greater political entities and for a larger geographical area.

Arguably we need an EU vulnerability analysis to identify shared European vulnerabilities and chart critical transnational infrastructure. This would be the precondition for defining EU homeland security goals, for prioritizing the numerous possible initiatives, and for allocating scarce resources in a way that ensures the maximum improvement in security and resilience. A vulnerability commission could also lead to the formulation of homeland security headline goals and formulation of common standards in areas where interoperability between national emergency management systems is crucial. Europe's anti-terrorism coordinator, Gijs de Vries, armed with a greater say in both Council and Commission and discretionary funds to be distributed to promote homeland security, could be tasked with following up on these measures.

*Transfer of DEMA into the Ministry of Defense*

It is hardly controversial in the European Union that effective international crisis management requires a combination of civilian and military instruments. Not just firepower, but also policing, legal training, and aid are required. What is true for Europe's efforts outside Europe is equally true when it comes to crisis management inside Europe – a broad range of instruments and actors need to be coordinated closely. The ability to protect European citizens in case of a terrorist attack or respond to a CBRN incident would be enhanced, if efforts could draw on a common pool of civilian and military assets.

As a reaction to the progressive blurring of the border between internal and external threats, Danish authorities have decided to remove the institutional divide between internal and external crisis management. Though issues of control and democratic accountability would need to be addressed, an increased integration of planning, procurement, education, and training of first responders and military forces in Europe could enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of EU homeland security as well.

*Cross-governmental coordination*

However, as discussed above, the transfer of DEMA in to the Ministry of Defense does not eliminate the challenge of cross-governmental coordination. Numerous agencies, different levels of government, and private companies that are not necessarily inclined to give priority to vulnerability reduction and emergency planning need to be persuaded to play their part. And as illustrated during the Danish national crisis management exercise of 2003 this is no simple task.<sup>89</sup>

If this is the reality, even in a small country where homeland security is among the top priorities of the government, where most top bureaucrats know each other, where most ministries are located within walking distance of each other, and where there is a tradition for coordination within the total defense framework, albeit a tradition that was mothballed for the better part of the 1990s, coordination and prioritization of homeland security in the EU will not be an easy task. Persuasion and voluntary coordination might not suffice.

Before the appointment of the EU anti-terrorism coordinator, Gijs de Vries, in the wake of the Madrid attacks, no one inside the EU had homeland security and counter-terrorism as a primary mission. Responsibility for protective and preventive initiatives is still divided between several different Directorate-Generals, between the EU level and national authorities, and between different organizations and levels of government within the EU member states.

Civil protection remains an area of member state competence. For those homeland security related tasks where the Union has or shares competence with member states – transportation, nuclear safety, Information Technology (IT) security – responsibilities are scattered between several different EU Directorate Generals (DG), such as DG Environment, DG Transportation, and DG Research, Development, Technology and Innovation, none of which have security as their primary mission or priority.<sup>90</sup> Lacking line authority over any of these institutions, the EU anti-terrorism coordinator has to rely on the power of persuasion – an insufficient instrument judging from the Danish experience.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has its problems. But at least it provides an institutional anchor and actor to keep homeland security on the political agenda, even as the attacks of September 11th recede into past and the temptation to revert to old ways rises. With line authority over at least some of the agencies providing homeland security, and a significant budget to promote

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<sup>89</sup> Danish Emergency Management Agency, "Samlet evalueringsrapport. Krisestyringsøvelse 2003 (KRISØV 2003)," (Copenhagen: DEMA, 2004), pp. 7, 12.

<sup>90</sup> However, DG Research is preparing to launch a European Security Research Program in 2007.

standardization and security at state- and local level, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, has been dealt significantly better cards than Europe's anti-terrorism coordinator.<sup>91</sup>

Arguably, if Europe is to forge an effective homeland security policy, an EU Directorate General for homeland security or a stronger anti-terrorism coordinator with a staff and budget will be needed.<sup>92</sup>

### **Conclusion: Too Little, Not Yet too Late**

The state of civil protection and efforts to reduce societal vulnerabilities in the U.S. prior to September 11th resemble the state of these fields in the European Union today: The amount of resources dedicated to the purpose varied from state to state as did planning, doctrine, training, and equipment. There were no national standards for first responder equipment, and the amount of federal resources going towards enhancing infrastructure and transportation security was very limited.<sup>93</sup>

The attacks of September 11th created a strong sense of urgency among policy-makers and a public demand for visible action. Thus, the U.S. government thrust itself forward in a multifaceted endeavor to enhance the security of the homeland. The reaction of the European Union was more measured and the sense of urgency has been less palpable despite the attacks on Madrid on March 11th, 2004. The Union has stepped up its cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. But when it comes to civil protection and protection of critical infrastructure the EU has not yet come very far.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, „Transatlantic Homeland Security: Why, What, and How?“, in Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Daniel S. Hamilton (eds.), *Transatlantic Homeland Security: Protecting Society in the Age of Catastrophic Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2005 forthcoming).

<sup>92</sup> Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *A European Department of Homeland Security? Organizing to protect Europeans against Large-Scale Terrorism*, DIIS Brief no. 32 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003).

<sup>93</sup> *Fact Sheet: Providing the Resources Necessary to Protect America*, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 18.October 2004, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041018-1.html>> (accessed: 26 October 2004).

<sup>94</sup> For a discussion of the EU's reaction to September 11th, see Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, „Homeland security. American and European responses to September 11th“ in Jess Pilegaard (ed.) *The Politics of European Security* (Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2004), pp. 159-178. See also: Preventiopl, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks, COM(2004) 698 final, Brussels, 20 October 2004, <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice\\_home/doc\\_centre/criminal/terrorism/doc/com\\_2004\\_698\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/criminal/terrorism/doc/com_2004_698_en.pdf)> (accessed: 29 October 2004).

Whereas the vulnerabilities and homeland security needs of the U.S. and Europe are to a great extent similar, the political, institutional, cultural, and historical backdrop differs. A European Union strategy should not necessarily copy the U.S. National Strategy of Homeland Security, but instead draw on best practices and relevant lessons from individual European countries, as discussed above.

Still, there is one clear lesson that applies directly from the U.S. experience: It is preferable to act before, rather than in the wake of a major terrorist strike. To save lives and to avoid rushed, ill considered policies that frequently result when politicians feel the urge to make up for earlier neglect in the wake of a disaster.

There is little doubt that effective and efficient protection of transnational infrastructure and transportation networks, defense against biological attacks, and crisis reaction in border areas require far closer EU coordination than what is currently taking place.